Rhetoric or Research

Welcome to "Rhetoric or Research: The CIA at UMass." "Rhetoric or Research" interprets student protests against CIA recruitment at UMass-Amherst during the 1980s. Discussing the CIA is often politically charged. As such, there is a large body of literature on CIA activities. This exhibit focuses on the UMass-Amherst campus and the discourse that students, faculty, administrators, and organizations engaged with to validate their perspectives and denigrate their opposition. Thematically organized into four parts - the CIA at UMass, Communism, Terrorism, and Discourse - this exhibit argues that campus discourse framed U.S. involvement in Central America on two axes: communist-free and terrorist-free.

This online exhibit is the result of the Ethir Fellowship program and research based on collections at the University of Massachusetts. A special thanks to everyone in the Department of Special Collections and University Archives for all their technical and research support. To help you navigate the exhibit, I recommend you review some of the site's features.

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Enjoy,
Tom Hohenstein

I'm currently a second year MA student in the History Department at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. I have a MLIS from Simmons College and completed my undergraduate at Gustavus Adolphus College. My primary research interest is Central America during the Cold War era. As this exhibit suggests, I'm also interested in the digital humanities, notably the intersection of library science and historical research.
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Jack Donaghy, played by Alec Baldwin on NBC's 30 Rock, aptly stated that "there is no wrong, you just have to find a subordinate you can push the blame onto." This gibe offers insight into the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) poor image. The CIA is often the whipping-boy for poorly executed or politically unpalatable foreign policy maneuvers, exhibited by phrases such as "the CIA-sponsored coup," "the failed CIA-backed Bay of Pigs invasion," “the CIA's Operation Phoenix," and "the CIA-funded Contras." Rarely is it "Nixon's objections to Allende," "JFK's botched invasion of Cuba," "LBJ's Phoenix Program," or "Reagan's Contras." The rhetorical distance between the President and the CIA creates space for critics to regard the CIA as a "renegade operation" that is uncontrollably "creating its own foreign policy." This practice alleviates the executive branch of responsibility for CIA activity as the subordinate takes the blame.

Particularly striking in the above photograph is the banner's outright defense of the CIA and its place in the U.S. Exemplifying a position held by many conservatives on campus during the 1980s, the banner claims the CIA is not an abnormality, a "necessary evil," or uncontrollable, it is "the American Way."

It is fair to assume that this speaker represents the converse position concerning the CIA, noting her "Put the CIA on Trial" t-shirt, the megaphone, and the crowd of demonstrators. The CIA on Trial Project was the culmination of anti-CIA sentiments on the UMass-Amherst campus. Building upon the Winooski 44 example, the objective of the CIA on Trial Project was to change CIA policy through judicial mandate, bringing the agency into line with the International Court of Justice ruling and interpretations of domestic law. For the speaker, the CIA is not the "American Way" but illegal, out of control, and a sponsoring terrorism. Thus, it should be banned from recruiting on campus.

The poster behind the peace-sign-painted student occupying Munson Hall in protest against CIA recruitment on campus reads, "Covert Inhumane Atrocities." While it is unknown which students in this image used civil disobedience and were arrested, it is certain that some did. Their actions increased tensions surrounding CIA recruitment on campus. No longer simply a rhetorical exercise to voice opposition, the acts of civil disobedience, the resulting arrests, and the subsequent necessity defense created a platform for the anti-CIA protesters to claim that CIA actions in Central America could escalate into "another Vietnam," justifying their occupation of university buildings.

In November 1980 more than 200 students gathered in front of the Student Union building to protest CIA recruitment on campus. The terms of debate, which still exist today, were already set. When asked about the demonstration, Judy Wiess commented, "if students really want jobs with the CIA they can get in touch with them, but murderers and torturers do not belong here." David St. Joan framed the rally as freedom issue, stating that "the entire views of the university are not being represented, the CIA has a right to be here, and we have a right to go to an interview on campus with them." Afro American Studies Professor John Bracey placed an intelligence and morality quotient on the issue saying, "it is insulting to UMass to think our students are so stupid and have no morality that this is the only kind of job they can get."

To the Left, the CIA was morally bankrupt and should be banned from recruiting on campus. To the Right, demonstrations against CIA recruitment infringed upon students' right to hear and the CIA's right to speak on campus. Both sides would ultimately place the issue into larger issues of morality, nationality, and intelligence. When the UMass-Amherst administration sought to stop protesters from disrupting CIA recruitment on campus, the individual photographed above thought the issue was being inverted, grabbed some poster board and a marker, and walked to Whitmore Hall.

"When an organization resorts to defacing property that does not belong to it, in an effort to promote an opinion, it is not only irresponsible, but insulting as well." The graffiti found on the Fine Arts Center had a mixed reception on campus. Yet, the graffiti was symbolic of student attempts to appropriate campus space, and the right to speak for all UMass students, as their own. When the CIA informational session on November 13, 1986 was canceled because demonstrating students prevented recruiters from entering the building, a plethora of opinions were unleashed in the campus's newspapers.

A dominant framework for interpreting revolutionary Central American is through the prism of the Cold War.

The limitations of the Cold War framework are exemplified by the Cuban Revolution and its aftermath. Cold War interpretations often place Castro's economic reforms as the instigator that angered U.S. multinational companies, which turned to Washington D.C. for assistance. After much showmanship, including the Bay of Pigs Invasion, the Soviets brought Cuba into its orbit. The U.S.S.R then used Cuba to install missiles aimed at the U.S., a situation which culminated in the Cuban Missile Crisis. This interpretation positions Cuba as a subordinate to both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Simply, Cuba is largely reacting to, instead of not acting upon, the superpowers.

A Castro-positioned perspective offers a different story. After seizing power in 1959, Castro began to institutionalize his regime and expel his political opponents, who were largely tied to the previous, U.S.-supported government. In a series of steps, Castro both weakened his internal opponents and limited the external threat posed by U.S. multinationals. However, these actions provoked a backlash in the form of the Bay of Pigs invasion. Sensing his vulnerability, Castro negotiated with the Soviet Union to have defensive missiles installed in Cuba, resulting in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The crisis ended with a U.S. public declaration to not invade Cuba and allowed Cuba to secure favorable trade agreements with the Soviet Union.

The Cold War framework understates how Castro used existing geo-political structures to achieve his own goals. "Smaller" players extracted major concessions from the so-called superpowers for their own reasons. The Cold War is better understood as a series of negotiations between players with varying objectives.

Teresa A. Meade, A History of Modern Latin America: 1800 to the Present (Malden, MA:Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 238-241.

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This framework's strength lies in the political rhetoric used both in the United States and in Central America. However, many analyses place the revolutions in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala into conversations about nationalism and development. Similar to a Castro-positioned analysis of the Cuban Revolution, these interpretations emphasize local political and economic conditions. For example, the FMLN grew out of the oligarchic organization of El Salvador and the extreme poverty that existed there, not an international communist conspiracy. Similarly, the FSLN had more to do with Somoza than with the Soviets. Where the Cold War paradigm was bolstered by governmental officials, nationalist-developmental arguments are legitimated by the rhetoric of local agents - often folded in with the revolutionaries - which focused on local conditions. For example, Somoza was fighting Cuban-backed Marxists (Cold War perspective) while the Sandinistas were fighting local poverty, economic stagnation, and an anti-democratic regime (nationalist-development framework). Different historical interpretations result from the rhetorical positioning of different historical actors.
[x] As insightful as both these interpretations are, they err on being either too marco or too micro, often ignoring the interplay between the Central American states themselves

At times we lose sight of the rivalries within Central America. For example, until the very end of the Somoza regime, the Sandinistas did not hold territory in Nicaragua. They were largely based in the mountainous areas on both sides of the Nicaraguan-Honduran border and in Costa Rica. Costa Rican support to the Sandinistas became more open and apparent as Somoza's fall became imminent. Honduran support for the Sandinistas constituted looking the other way as the guerrillas operated in isolated areas of the country. Years later, a new scenario developed. Now Honduras openly supported Contra activities in exchange for U.S. aid, while Costa Rica largely ignored Contra activity within its territory. Simply, both before and after Somoza's fall there was non-governmental military activity occurring in both Costa Rica and Honduras against the recognized state of Nicaragua.

It's hard to see how local players within Costa Rica and Honduras benefited from aiding both the Sandinistas and the Contras unless the entire scenario is viewed regionally. Honduras and Costa Rica viewed Nicaragua's entanglement as beneficial, regardless of its ideological underpinnings. Nicaragua's weakness strengthened both Honduras and Costa Rica within the regional paradigm because all the Central American states export similar corps, compete for U.S. aid, and strive for to political and economic dominance of the isthmus. With these regional factions in mind we can better understand the range of motivations that impacted revolutionary Central America. [x]

as well as the evolving terms of the debate. The Cold War of the 1950s was not the same Cold War of the 1980s, and at times the lumping together the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s into one period can obscure more than enlighten. Further, the catharsis the Vietnam War had on the U.S. reshaped the United States' objectives abroad and their implementation. Hence, the Vietnam syndrome entrance into U.S. discourse.
[x] While the previous section showed the spirited debate surrounding the CIA on campus, this section of the exhibit reveals the gradual, back-and-forth evolution of campus discourse away from communist-free and towards terrorist-free. The communist-free and terrorist-free dichotomies are of course simplifications. However, they do help set rhetorical benchmarks upon which conversations can be placed. Further, catch-all labels were, and are, frequently used to justify certain actions and policies. Unfortunately, in American discourse complex issues are often grossly simplified for communicative purposes - a phenomena that cuts across the political spectrum.
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It is virtually impossible to discuss Central American revolutions without mentioning Augusto Sandino. Of interest to this exhibit is the Sandino button

Without understanding the iconography and cultural power of Sandino, it is impossible to understand Nicaragua. Any taxi ride in Managua makes this more than apparent; references to the General de Hombres Libres can be found on virtually every block. While Sandino is many things to many people, he is above all a dominant nationalist icon in Nicaragua. His battle to free Nicaragua from Yanqui imperialism and vendepatrias inspired revolutionaries throughout the Somoza era.

Sandino also highlights the power relations behind labels. During the Somoza era, Sandino was painted as nothing more than a bandit, a common thief with no political motivation. With the rise of the Sandinista's, Sandino became a hero and a defender of the homeland. For more information about Sandino see Michael J. Schroeder's bibliography.

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worn by the UMass student above. To the U.S. Sandino was a "bandit" and was interpreted as such during the Somoza dynasty. Carlos Fonseca and the Sandinista Revolution incorporated Sandino's nationalist rhetoric of "Patria Libre o Morir."

The people I "lived with want the truth told that Nicaragua wants peace. Their slogan, she said, is 'free country or death.'" - Judy Lieberman

"They shouted 'Patria Libre - o Morir!' 'Sandino vive - La lucha sique.'" - Jonathan Maslow in reference to Sandinista soldiers

"The Contras should adopt slogans from the American Revolution, then proclaimed 'Give me liberty or give me death!'" - Matthew Whiting - president of UMass Republican Club

Both Judy Lieberman and Jonathan Maslow encountered the same phrase and historical thread, during their time in Nicaragua. Matthew Whiting, touching on the opposing historical strain, thought the Contras needed a better, more revolutionary, slogans to encapsulate their cause. Both sides wanted a freedom and peace, however, each side defined those terms differently. Peace for the Sandinistas meant the establishment of a revolutionary government, while peace for the Contras meant overthrowing them. Everyone wants peace, peace on their terms that is.

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From bandit to national hero to a button, Sandino invokes a powerful nationalist framework Greg Grandin suggests that revolutionary Central America might best be defined as attempts to overcome "an unsustainable model of exclusionary nationalism" based on export development, limited access ot the state, and patron-defined social relations. In other words, their was a violent debate over what the state was and who controlled it. Picking up on the rhetoric of local actors, Grandin and others place Latin America's "long Cold War" into the nationalist framework. This argument continues the move away from Cold War rhetoric concerning international communism and superpower overdeterminism. Greg Grandin and Gilbert M. Joseph, ed., A Century of Revolutions: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Violence During Latin America's Long Cold War (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 28.

[x] that cannot be fully explained within the communist-free paradigm. The traditional Cold War framework left little room for nationalism, despite the recognition of numerous nations through decolonization. Discourse surrounding nationalist movements was left wanting as movements were intellectually folded into one of the two camps. Therefore, the picture drawn of the Sandinistas in the U.S. had less to do with the historical circumstances of the Sandinista movement and more to do with placing them into a largely binary perspective. This made it difficult to articulate an anti-U.S., democratic, nationalist movement such as the Sandinistas. Further, insightful portrayals of movements as largely nationalist were drowned out in anti-communist rhetoric.
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The "Nicaragua Libre" shirt worn in what is presumably an occupied office in Whitmore Hall draws on the same history as the Sandino button. Even a Google search of "Nicaragua Libre" exposes this history - from Sandino, to music, to non-profits, to Facebook. "Nicaragua Libre" is a loaded phrase with different meanings in different times, contingent upon the locality and context of enunciation.

As such, "Nicaragua Libre" is another example of the limits of the communist-free framework when positioned against nationalist rhetoric. While "Nicaragua Libre" is typically associated with Sandino and later the Sandinistas, the history of "Nicaragua Libre" places the debate concerning CIA recruitment outside conversations about communism. Its presence in Whitmore Hall in 1986 places U.S. involvement in Central America into the imperialist framework of the early 20th century, undercutting rhetorical accusations of the Sandinista-Soviet connection, and provokes another interpretation.

To alter a debate, it is necessary to both change how you are perceived and the perception of your adversary. For example, to battle the international communist conspiracy label, it is expedient to position a cause into local, nationalist framework. It is then logical to reframe your opposition as imperialistic to bolster a nationalist argument - thus shifting the conversation out of the Cold War mentality. As bad as communists were, there remained an even more vehement label to hurl upon your opposition.

Terrorism is as complex a label as ever existed. The phrase originates from the French Revolution and Robespierre, yet there is no commonly agreed upon definition. Common concepts among many definitions are fear, "drastic" or "extreme" violence, politically motivated, and the connotation of illegitimacy. Terrorism can be state-sponsored, (although this is somewhat contentious) or conducted by non-state actors. Because terrorism remains indefinable, it best thought of as a method of political communication.

Of interest in this photograph is not only the labeling of the CIA as a state-sponsor of terrorism but also how this label changes the conversation about U.S. involvement in Central America. U.S. support for the Contras is framed as illegitimate, illegal, and imperialist. The antithesis of being a terrorist is the freedom fighter, which sets up the terrorist-free framework.

Who were the Contras? Well, it's complicated. The Contras were several groups opposed to the Sandinista regime. Many contended that they were "created" by the CIA, but it is now commonly recognized that while the CIA was quick to support the Contras after Reagan's election, their first international backer was Argentina. Further, some disillusioned Sandinistas became Contras. Additionally, some switched sides frequently and for a multitude of reasons. To further complicate matters, it must be noted that Nicaragua is not as homogeneous as one might expect. The Caribbean coast is drastically different from the "Hispanic" west. Therefore, when the Sandinistas took power there was a large population that not only did not identify with the revolution, but also barely identified as Nicaraguan.

Sometimes politics and fashion collide in interesting ways. One of the first justifications for funding the Contras was to intercept arms moving from Nicaragua to the FMLN in El Salvador. Looking closely, we can see the individual holding the "Not a Penny" sign is wearing a button reading "FMLN."

At times historical research deconstructing debates and rhetoric loses sight of the urgency of the situation. Included here are a few examples of the scope of the violence in Nicaragua and El Salvador.

The war in El Salvador was brutal. However, the photographed sign is a bit misleading. First, U.S. aid to El Salvador was Congressionally approved and certified by the Reagan administration. The sign's author conflates openly covert CIA support to the Contras in Nicaragua with open U.S. military support for El Salvador's military. This leads to the question of whether the sign's author was misinformed or was using a rhetorical device to further a point. After all, the CIA's reputation on campus was already tarnished and presented an easy target. Further, the sign's author was politically engaged and likely familiar with how U.S. aid reached El Salvador. This might seem trivial at the UMass student protest level, but it is important to reflect upon when rhetoric becomes research.

As the CIA recruitment issue intensified, student groups organized to make their opinions heard - especially after Abbie Hoffman and Amy Carter came to campus and the national press began to take notice. Occupied buildings and student arrests gave rise to a level of 1960s nostalgia.

Both sides sought to position themselves within U.S. history and label their opponents as un-American. Conservatives made liberals into book-burning communists. Liberals turned conservatives into ignorant right-wing terrorists. The majority in the middle occasionally complained about both sides.

"I don't see why they have to make it a big deal, they are at school to go to classes." - Hollis Harrington
"I think everyone has made their point, and it's getting to be a hassle. They are getting in the way now." - Frances Edwards
"Protesting is fine but it can be abused, just like alcohol can be abused." - Brad Smith

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Left-leaning activists maintained a steady drum beat labeling the CIA as terrorists. Moving the conversation into the burgeoning terrorist-free analysis allowed the Left to incorporate anti-imperialistic rhetoric from Central America and use the CIA to avoid directly attacking the popular Ronald Reagan. However, unlike the Right, the Left remained unsure about what the issue really was.

The Right was uniformly clear that CIA recruitment on campus was a freedom issue. Simply, the CIA had the right to speak on campus and students had the right to listen to them. Further, the Right maintained that the Sandinistas were totalitarian and that contrary reports were akin to the glowing reports of Soviet Union from the 1930s. The so-called "terrorist Contras" were freedom fighters. Not only did the Left remain politically suspect to the Right, but their physical appearance was suspect as well.

Representatives of the state do not always respond kindly to protesters occupying offices and obstructing traffic. Additionally, many students did not side with the protesters' main concern, CIA recruitment on campus. Others wondered why there was such a fuss about this particular issue.

Protesters' actions lead to the arrest of fifty-one individuals for trespassing. The upcoming trial gave both sides much to talk about as demonstrations and educational forums continued on campus. However, the talk alienated some as positions became more rhetorical and less researched.

Attempting to obtain court transcripts, I called the Northampton Court office. A kind individual answered my inquiry about the CIA trial from 1987 by informing me that "we wouldn't have jurisdiction over a federal agency" and "the trial you're talking was a trespassing case" and that all they have is a court docket.

A five-minute phone conversation fourteen years after the fact reflected the politics and strategy of the trial. On one hand, the case was about condemning the CIA through the necessity of defense with national ramifications. On the other side it was a trespassing case with at best local ramifications. Labeling the case "CIA on Trial" overtly positioned the conversation on one side, a conversation the court clerk quickly reoriented by reminding me of jurisdictional authority. However, the phrase "CIA on Trial" remained powerful enough for two strangers to communicate about the case years later.

The trial's not-guilty verdict energized anti-CIA activists. As the sign indicates, the local struggle planned to join national activists in Washington D.C. On campus, CIA recruitment was shelved for the upcoming academic year and activists continued to locate CIA recruitment activities in Western Massachusetts and protest, notably in Springfield.

In the realm of foreign politics, success for anti-CIA activists was harder to realize. While the Contras were active in Nicaragua throughout the later half of the 1980s, they remained politically divided and unable to permanently secure any territory in Nicaragua. In 1990 the Sandinistas were defeated at the polls and the conservative Violeta Chamorro took office. Decisive in the election was the Sandinista-imposed-draft and the perception that the war would end if the Sandinistas lost the election - which it did. In the larger lens of U.S. military activity in Central America, openly covert became overt during Operation Just Cause and the invasion of Panama in 1989.

If outright victory for anti-CIA activists remained elusive, conservatives did not fair any better. Seeing the CIA in a positive light remains impossible for a notable proportion of the U.S. populous. In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas remain a potent political force, as do the FMLN in El Salvador. Further, most historical interpretations of revolutionary Central America strongly lean towards the anti-CIA activists' positions at the time.

However, by 1994 Right-leaning administrations were in office in Nicaragua and El Salvador. More importantly, neoliberalism was economically fashionable and reshaping the region. Just as in Central America, neither the Right nor the Left could achieve a lasting victory.

Does freedom reign? Depends on who is asking and where they are located. Debate over CIA recruitment at UMass during the 1980s touched upon values like freedom of expression and the preservation of individual rights. However, the debate also evokes structural issues concerning foreign policy. Free individuals labeled sections of their government terrorist. Of course many disagreed, and even more decided not to engage, but the discourse hints at the opposite within. Virtually everyone inside the U.S. labeled the Central American republics as a form of non-free, either because of U.S. involvement or due to oppressive regimes. Regardless of whether they were terrorists or communists, they were not from the U.S. and not free.

If discourse drives for dualism, or binaries like the good/bad example, for freedom to exist, conceptually there must be something non-free. Terrorism is notoriously difficult to define, but so is freedom.

Among the definitions for freedom in the Oxford English Dictionary are the following:

"The state or fact of being free from servitude, constraint, inhibition, etc.;"
"Liberation from the bondage or dominating influence of sin, spiritual servitude, worldly ties, etc.;"
"The state of being able to act without hindrance or restraint;"
"The fact of not being controlled by or subject to fate;"
"Facility or ease in action or activity; absence of encumbrance or hindrance."

Freedom is largely defined negatively; it is a state of not being constrained, dominated, hindered, or encumbered. Without the negatives, freedom loses much of its definition. Similar to terrorism, everybody or nobody could be free. For freedom to exist, someone or something has to be non-free; a definitional process that has become a generational exercise in the U.S.
From: "freedom, n.". OED Online. June 2011. Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com.silk.library.umass.edu/view/Entry/74395?rskey=OcwlNh&result=1&isAdvanced=false (accessed August 16, 2011)

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In this way, the protesters' rhetoric at UMass was a self-affirmation of their own, real or perceived, freedom.

Given the title and context of the photograph, it is doubtful that the individual above is signing a contract. More likely, he is registering to receive more information about military service. I chose to end with this photograph because I've been knowingly withholding two interesting facts. First, the CIA recruited at UMass-Amherst because of student interest. Second, the protests seem to have increased career interest in the CIA.